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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
FREED FINANCE COMPANY,
a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
W. J. PREECE, WILLIAM V.
PREECE and PREECE MOTOR,
INC., a corporation,
Defendants,
WILLIAM V. PREECE,
Defendant and Appellant,

Case No. 9858

APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action brought to enforce payment of
an indebtedness claimed due from defendants arising from the purchase of conditional sales contracts
and notes receivable. The individual defendants,
W. J. Preece and William V. Preece were alleged to
have executed and delivered a written guarantee
and waiver assuming the corporate indebtedness.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Preece Motor, Inc., a corporation, ~and W. J.
Preece, defendants, stipulated in open court that if
1
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proof were adduced that $10,000.00 would be found
to be due and owing Freed Finance Company from
Preece Motor, Inc. W. J. Preece and Preece Motor,
Inc. accordingly stipulated that judgment could be
entered against each of them for that amount. Judgment was entered against defendant William V.
Preece on the basis of a purported guarantee signed
by his son, W. J. Preece, 'and 'said defendant, William
V. Preece, ·appeals from that judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Appellant, William V. Preece, seeks
reversal of the judgment entered against him and
dismissal of the action as against him.
STATEMEN·T OF FACTS
During the early part of 1960 the plaintiff
respondent, Freed Finance Company, hereinafter
referred to as "Freed," notified Preece Motor, Inc.
and W. J. Preece that it would not continue to purchase conditional sales contracts and accounts receivable from that corporation unless the defendants
W. J. Preece and William V. Preece personally guaranteed the payment of all such obligations due or to
become due to Freed (Tr. 15-16).
M. R. Weiler, the only agent of Freed who testified, stated that he did not have any conversation
with appellant William V. Preece, hereinafter referred to as "Preece, Sr.," with regard to signing
the guarantee, and that the document later intro2
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duced into evidence (over appellants' objection) as
"Exhibit 1-P" was not signed in his presence (Tr.
18). Weiler also testified that W. J. Preece, the son
of Preece, Sr., delivered the guarantee (Exhibit 1P) to him without any explanation or conversation
(Tr. 17). W. J. Preece testified that his signature
appeared on the guarantee (Tr. 21) and that he had
been asked to obtain his father's signature but that
he had signed his father's (Preece, Sr.) name on it,
thinking that he had some kind of a power of attorney to sign (Tr. 21, .22).
The son, W. J. Preece, testified that the only
documents he had signed his father's name to prior to
this time under a power of attorney consisted of endorsing some checks that were made out to him
(Preece, Sr.) while he (Preece, Sr.) was on a mission
some years before (Tr. 23). Preece, Sr. objected to
the admission of the power of attorney (Tr. 24)
and upon voir dire examination W. J. Preece (the
son) testified as follows:
"BY MR. RITCHIE:
"Q. Mr. Preece, the date set out in this
power of attorney is February, 1954, is that
correct?
"A. Yes, it is.
"Q. When was that with relation to the
time your father went on a mission?
"A. This was just prior to his going.
"Q. And this was executed within how
long before he left on his mission?
3
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"A. I would say within a week or two.
"Q. And where did he go on his mission?
"A. To England.
"Q. And when did he return from his
mission?
"A. Well, it was probably in the fall of
'56.
"Q. Now, do you recall it would have
been 1955, would it not, he was over there just
slightly over eighteen months, is that correct?
"A. No, just slightly over two years.
"A. Now, was your father, William V.
Preece, present when this document was
drafted?
"A. I don't recall.
"Q. Well, if he had have been, he would
have had the correct name in there, would he
not?
Well, that is maybe argument. Did you
actually make arrangements for the obtaining
of this power of attorney?
"A. Did I make arrangements?
"Q. Yes.
"A. Yes, I did with my father.
"Q. And the purpose of this power of
attorney was so that you could handle his
affairs during the time he was on his mission,
is that correct?
"A. That's correct."
Thereupon objection to its admissibility was
renewed on the further ground that the power of
4
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attorney was given to be used only for the duration
of a trip abroad during which time Preece, Sr., was
serving a mission and it expired by its own terms
and by operaion of law upon Preece, Sr.'s return
from his mission. The objection of Preece, Sr., was
renewed as follows:
"MR. RITCHIE: Renew my objection,
Your Honor, and object on the further ground
that inasmuch as this power of attorney was
given only for the purpose of taking care of
Mr. Preece, Sr.'s affairs during the time that
he was on a mission and it expired by its own
terms upon his return in 1955 or '56, whatever
the date may have been, and at the time of
the alleged occurrence it was not in force.
"MR. CALLISTER: Fine, we will so
stipulate if counsel will. Will you so stipulate,
Mr. Boyle?" (Tr. 26, 27)
Freed's only witnesses at the trial, other than
M. R. Weiler, were the defendants W. J. Preece and
Preece, Sr., who were called as Freed's witnesses.
There was no testimony or evidence introduced by
Freed to show that Freed had any knowledge of, or
relied upon the power of attorney (Ex. 2-P, Tr. 1518). Further Freed did not know that a power of
attorney had ever been given until long after the
action was started and did not allege that the guarantee had been signed by a purported attorney-infact. On the other hand, Preece, Sr., did not know
of the existence of the guarantee (Ex. 1-P) until
after the litigation was commenced as his son did
not advise him that he had signed it (Tr. 37). The
5
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court ruled that there was no evidence that defendant Preece, Sr. signed the guarantee (Ex. 1-P, Tr.
52). W. J. Preece testified as to conversations with
his father with respect to Exhibit 2-P which took
place before Preece, Sr. went on his mission (Tr. 3134). W. J. Preece testified that it was Preece, Sr.'s
idea that he (the son) was to have his power of attorney so he could handle his financiral affairs while
he, Preece, Sr., was away on his mission. He repeatedly testified that the power of attorney was given
him by his f ather (Preece, Sr.) to use while Preece
Sr. was on a mission ('Tr 31-34).
1

In response to questions by Freed's counsel, W.
J. Preece testified as follows (Tr. 34):
"Q. Now when this power of attorney
was given to you by your father, he was going
to England on a mission and he had certain
things to be done during his absence, isn't
that correct?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Now since he returned from his mission did you exercise the power of attorney?
"A. No, sir, I hadn't ever used it.
"Q. And you had never used it?
"A. Right."
W. J. Preece testified that he did not exercise
the power of attorney at any time after his father
returned from his mission other than in signing the
proposed Exhibit 1-P, and that the only time he
6
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attempted to exercise the power while his father
was on a n1ission in 1954 and 1955 was in endorsing
some checks on his behalf (Tr. 35).
Preece, Sr. testified that he left on a mission to
England on the first of February, 1954, and returned
in Septe1nber of 1955. He further stated that he
did not sign proposed Exhibit 1-P nor did he authorize anyone to sign it on his behalf at any time (Tr.
37, 44).
William V. Preece testified concerning the
power of attorney as follows (starting at Tr. 39):
"Q. (By Mr. Callister) Mr. Preece, I
hand you what has been introduced as plaintiff's Exhibit 2-P and ask you if you had pre
pared for you a power of attorney during
the calendar month of February, 1954?
"A. Yes, I asked for this.
"Q. And who did you employ, if any, to
prepare it for you?
"A. Well, Bill said he would take care
of it and he brought the blank to me and I
signed it.
"Q. Now did you have any conversation
with your son, William J. Preece, as to that
power of attorney?
"A. No, no more than just I wanted him
to have the power of attorney while I \Vas on
my mission, while I was away.
"Q. Well now, just tell us whether or not
you had a conversation with him as to the
time limit of this power of attorney?
7
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"A. I don't remember any conversation
to that effect.
"Q. Well, am I led to believe that there
was no discussion at all between you and Mr.
W. J. Preece as to this power of attorney
other than just having it prepared?
"A. Well, it was just my intent and my
wife's too that we have him have that power
of attorney while we were gone."
William V. Preece further testified (Tr. 42):
"Q. (By Mr. Callister) Was this power
of attorney to continue until you made a modifiation or change of it?
"A. No, I just signed the bl1ank figuring
at the time I was gone on my mission that this
was in effect and that was it.

* * *
On cross examination at Tr. 42:
"Q. (By Mr. Ritchie) Now, Mr. Preece,
did you at about the time this power of attorney was given have a conversation with your
son Bill Preece, to the effect at which time
he said that maybe it was the best way to
handle affairs was for you to have a power
of attorney while you were away?
"A. Yes, yes, we did.
"Q. Now what else was said at that time
during that conversation?

* * *

"Q. (By Mr. Ritchie) Now wasn't there
some discussion at about the time the power
8
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of attorney was given with reference to his
handling checks to be deposited to your account during the time you were away?
"A. Yes.
"Q. And what did you instruct him at
that time with reference to those checks?

"A. W·ell, just sign them and send them
to me or put them into my account.
"Q. So that you could pay your expenses
while you were on a mission?

"A. That's right.
"Q. Now was it during that conversation that the necessity for the power of attorney came up?

"A. Well, I don't just remember exactly
whether that was at that time or not but we
talked it over previously and we thought that
was the best way to handle it.
"Q. Then in fact, if you know, did your
son, W. J. Preece actually use .this power of
attorney in connection with depositing checks
and matters like that?

"A. Yes.
"Q. And was that during what period,
Mr. Preece?

"A. Well, that was during the period
of '54 and '55 when I was on a mission.
"Q.

And since tha:t time has he exercised
9
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any powers on your behalf pursuant to this
power of attorney?
"A. Nothing that I know of except this.
"Q. Well, this purported signature of
the guarantee in this lawsuit was the only
item, or the only matter with which you are
acquainted where he attempted to exercise
that power after you returned from your
mission, is that correct?
"A. That'~s right.
"Q. Now did W. J. Preece ever conduct
on your behalf after you returned from your
mission any other business other than that?
"A. Not to sign my name.
"Q. And specifically with reference to
this guarantee, did you authorize him or request him to sign your name to that document?
"A. No, I didn't.
"Q. What was the reason that you didn't
take any steps to terminate this power of attorney after you returned from your 1nission?
"A. Well, we just never done anything
about it, just thought it was terminated. That
was the agreement. That is what we had
talked over. That was the understanding, my
understanding that that is what it was for is
when I was gone.
"Q. And so at the time the power of attorney was given, then it was given in the
close relationship to the time you left on your
mission and it was assumed that it was given
for that purpose only, is that correct?
"A. Yes, sir." ('Tr. 42-44).
10
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Again on redirect examination Mr. William V.
Preece repeatedly testified that the power of attorney was given for the purpose of handling his
affairs only during the time he was away on his mission, and with the understanding that it was to be
used only while he was gone (Tr. 45). Preece, Sr.
further testified that he discussed the necessity of
having a power of attorney and the understanding
was that W. J. Preece could carry on if something
came up pertaining to his affairs while he was away
(Tr. 46).
Preece Sr. and Freed, through their counsel,
stipulated that if evidence were adduced Freed could
prove that $10,000.00 was due and owing from
Preece Motor, Inc. to Freed as of February 29, 1960.
Appellant, Preece, Sr. entered into said stipulation
without admitting in any manner any liability to
Freed and specifically reserved all rights, including
the right to appeal and the right to challenge the
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment
of the trial court ( R. 53).

ARGUMENT
Preliminary Argument
The purported guarantee is the only basis upon
which Preece, Sr., could be held liable. In order for
such liability to attach, Freed had the burden of establishing that the power of attorney (Ex. 2.-P,
signed in February, 1954) was in force on February
29, 1960, when Preece, Sr.'s name was, in effect,
11
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forged on the guarantee (Ex. 1-P) by his son, W.
J. Preece, the president of the corporation. Further,
it was encumbent on Freed to show that the power
of attorney was broad enough to authorize the purported agent to act when such action was entirely
and wholly unrelated to the purpose for which the
power was given. It is clear that Freed failed to
sustain this burden, and that the court erroneously
held the power of attorney to be in full force and
effect in 1960.
The guarantee was not signed by Preece, Sr. or
with his authority ('Tr. 37, 44). The power of attorney can be of no help to Freed in establishing
liability as Freed had no knowledge whatsoever of
the existence of the power of attorney in February,
1960, nor wrus there any evidence that it relied on an
agency. It had expired by operation of law within a
reasonable time after 1954 regardless of any other
circumstances. It cannot be denied that a reasonable
time had expired and that some six years later W.
J. Preece had no authority to act on behalf of Preece
Sr. in signing the guarantee. (See Restatement of
Agency, 2nd Ed., Sec. 106). Further, the law is clear
that a power of attorney expires upon the accomplishment of the authorized act or purpose for which
it was given by operation of law without more. (See
2 Am. J ur. 50, Agency, Sec. 56)
The courts, without exception, hold that in the
construction of a power of attorney such as is involved here, that it is the intent .and circumstances
12
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of the parties at the time the p<nver is given that
determine the scope and duration of the power.
(2 C.J.S. 1220, Agency, Sec. 97) The evidence is untroverted that the power of attorney was given by
Preece, Sr. to his son to handle his affairs while on a
mission for his church, and for no other reason or
purpose. There is no basis in law or equity to ,affirm
the decision of the lower court and to follow the
same would cause h!avoc in normal busine'Ss transactions far beyond comprehension.
ARGUMENT
POJjNT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE POWER OF ATTORNEY AND THE AGENCY HAD
NOT BEEN TERMINATED PRIOR TO THE UNAUTHORIZED SIGNING OF THE GUARANTEE.

There is no evidence whatsoever that Freed had
any knowledge of the existence of the power of attorney prior to the time of the trial. Therefore,
there could have been no reliance whatsoever on it
by Freed. The trial court in its Memorandum Decision of May 25, 1962 erroneously concluded:
" ... the father should have terminated
power when he returned from England if he
no longer wished his son to exercise that
power; that he should have destroyed the
writing that created it.
"The fact that the son believed he had
authority to sign his father's name, is, to me,
some evidence that the authority existed. The
son, prdba:bly as well as anybody else, knew
13
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what was intended when the power of attorney was gran ted to him.
"Therefore, everything considered, the
court finds that the authority to act existed
in the son when he signed; that as between the
plaintiff and William V. Preece, the fault or
responsibility for the circumstances which led
to the extension of credit by plaintiff rests
upon the latter. By reason thereof that phase
of the lawsuit should be resolved in favor of
plaintiff." (R. 44, 45)
It is conceivable that the result should have
been as the trial court indicated if Freed had dealt
with W. J. Preece as the agent of Preece, Sr., with
his knowledge, or if Preece, Sr. had in any manner
induced Freed to extend credit based on any representations that W. J. Prece was his agent. The law
under no stretch of the imagination requires notice
or the physical destruction of the power of attorney
under circumstances such as are present in this case.
Further, there are no facts upon which an estoppel may be based as there was no evidence of a
reliance on the power of attorney in any sense of the
word. On the contl·ary, it is clear that Freed had no
knowledge of the existence of the po,Yer and on the
other hand, Preece, Sr. had no kno\vledge that his
son had signed his name on the guarantee uttil many,
many months later when the litigation was commenced. It would be re111arkable and unique, to say
the least, as a legal consequence, if liability could
attach under the circumstances of this case upon any
14
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of the theorie's advanced, or otherwise.
It is simply a matter of Freed attempting to
take advantage of something that occurred to it as
an afterthought. It is apparent from reading the
transcript of the trial that at the outset counsel for
Freed did not seriously contend that Preece, Sr.
could be held liable. This is evidenced by the following proposal for a stipulation addressed to Mr. Boyle
as counsel for V/. J. Preece:
''MR. RI'TCHIE: Renew my objection,
Your Honor, and object on the further ground
that inasmuch as this power of attorney was
given only for the purpose of taking care of
Mr. Preece, Sr.'s affairs during the time that
he was on a mission and it expired by its own
terms upon his return in 1955 or '56, whatever
the date may ha:ve been, and at the time of the
alleged occurrence it was not in force.
"MR. CALLISTER: Fine, we will so stipulate if counsel will. Will you so stipulate,
Mr. Boyle?
"MR. BOYLE: I am not in a position to
stipulate." (Tr. 26, .27)
The intent of the grantor of the power, i.e.,
Preece, Sr., at the time the power was given, is of
paramount importance in the determination of this
matter. The facts and tes~timony compel the conclusion that the power of attorney, according to the
understanding of the parties 'at the time, 'was limited
to the accomplishment of a single purpose and
15
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given for the duration of Preece, Sr.'s mission only,
and for no other purpose.
The decision of the trial court is contrary to
'all e'Stablished rules of agency and cannot be sustained.
It is of course basic that the duration of an
agency depends primarily upon the express or implied agreement between the principal and the agent.
It is well settled tHat the duration may be implied by
the purpose of the agency and the circum'Stances of
the parties. Further the fulfillment of the purpose
for which the agency is created terminates the
agency. See 2 CJS 1148, Agency, Sec. 68 and 2 CJS
115'2, Agency, Sec. 72.
Certainly there can be no authority express or
implied upon which the agent had any authority to
exercise the guarantee in question. The court's attention is directed to the following at 2 CJS 1222,
Agency, Sec. 98, under General Principles and Construction of Powers of Attorney:
"Letters or powers of attorney are construable as other contracts in the light of the
object or purpose of the agreement as manifested by the language used in the attendant
circumstances, the courts, in construction of
such instruments, restricting the powers
granted to such as appertain to the business
confided to the agent and are exercised in the
principal's interest, and endeavoring to discover and effectuate the principal's intention.
* * *
"The object of the parties, and more par16
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ticularly that of the principal, to the agree·
ment should ever be kept in view, and the
power, although given in general terms, construed subject to, and limited by, the clear and
obvious intent of the agency therein created;
the guiding principle of construction is to be
derived from a consideration of the result
which the agent is appointed to accomplish.
·· * * * to be read in the light of
the surrounding circumstances so as to give
effect to the evident intention of the principal
as to the time of the power. It is pe~missible
to examine all the circumstances under which
a written authority was executed so far as
actually or presumably present to the minds
of the parties for the purpose of enabling
the court to understand their situation and
apply their words to the right subject matter
in light of all attendant conditions. Circumstance1s lying in parol may be adduced in this
connection to aid the construction not by controlling the terms as set down but by securing
their application to the proper objects. Where
the instrument sets out or explains the circumstances under which it was executed, it is
fair of course in construing it to take those
circumstances into consideration." (Underscoring ours.)
We must keep in mind what the object or the
purpose of the power of attorney was. It cannot be
questioned under the evidence that it was given to
the son to be used while the father was away on a
mission. Under the foregoing general rule even
though the power irs given in general terms, it must
be construed subject to and limited by the clear and
17
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obvious intent of the agency and the result which the
agent is appointed to accomplish. The record is replete with the expression of intent of the grantor
Preece, Sr. It is a leading and fundamental principle
that the authority is to he construed to give effect to
the principal's purpose and intention in creating the
agency. We quote from Vol. 2, C.J.S., at page 1220,
Sec. 97, with respect to the application of the foregoing rule:
"That intent, and not technical reasoning
is of prime import in the construction of the
agents' mandate."
To torture the power of attorney into a superannuated existence would defeat the very purpose
for which it was given. This should not be tolerated.
Again we quote from Vol. 2, CJS, a:t page 1220,
Agency, Sec. 97:
"A fair and liberal construction designed
to achieve and not to defeat the ends and purposes of the agreement should be given to the
agreement, within the limits and subject to
the operation of the principles hereinbefore
announced ...

* * *

"The tenns and expressions implied are
to be accorded an ordinary and natural meaning, in the light of the purpose contemplated,
and not to be subjected to any forced, strained, or doubtful construction, either to enlarge
or restrict their natural import; and under no
circumstances should construction be used as
a device to enlarge the authority beyond the
powers * * *"
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The relationship of principal and agent demands
the highest degree of honesty, loyalty and integrity
and the utmost good faith in the agent's dealing with
his principal. In any event, no one should be permitted to enjoy the fruits of an advantage taken of
a fiduciary relationship whose dominant characteristic is a confidence reposed by one in another. The
principles of equity demand that such consideration
must be preserved to the utmost in any transaction
involving the exercise of authority by an agent. For
an excellent statement of this general rule see Vol. 2,
Calif. Jurisprudence, 2d, 7'72, Agency, Section 104.
The trial court erred in attempting to attach
liability in an "after the fact" fashion which is contrary to all principles of justice and law and the
judgment should be reversed.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE ~SIGNING OF THE GUARANTEE WAS WITHIN
THE PURPOSE OR INTENT OF THE POWER OF ATTORNEY AND THE AGENCY CREATED THEREBY.

For the reasons heretofore cited and under the
applicable law the signing of the guarantee by W. J.
Preece some six years after it was given is not binding on Preece, Sr. While the power was exercised
by the son in connection with transactions involving the savings or checking account of Preece, Sr.
while he was away on a mission, no further attempt
was made to exercise the power until over four
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years after Preece, Sr. returned from his mission.
The power of attorney was given for a particular
purpose and the law relating to the problem is carefully set out in Vol. 2, CJS, Page 1229, Agency, Sec.
99, as follows:
"Whether any particular act or transaction is comprised within the authority granted depends upon its relation to the purpose
of the agency, as being usually or necessarily
connected with the accomplishment of that
purpose * * * A distinct and independent
power cannot be made to spring by implication from the grant of another distinct power;
land an act which is 'adverse to the interests
of the principal and not eon templated to benefit him, being obviously not such as is necessary or usual in the proper accomplishment of
the objects df the agency, is clearly outside
the authority.
In the ca'Se at bar there is no connection whatsoever with the signing of the guarantee and the
accomplishment of the purpose of the power of
attorney, i.e., conducting Preece, Sr.'s affairs while
away on a mission. The signing of the guarantee
was defiinitely adverse to the interests of the principal, Preece, Sr., and could not be said to have
benefitted him. Under Utah law Preece, Sr. is not
bound. See Huntsman v. H1.c,ntsman ( 1920) 56 Utah
609, 192 P. 368 and Howard v. National Copper
Bank et al. (1933) 81 Utah 493, 20 P.2d 610.
The actions of the former agent in signing the
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guarantee were clearly outside the authority granted. This would be true even if the power of attorney
could have been said to have been in effect at the
time of the signing of the guarantee in 1960 because
the signing of the same was not necessarily or
usually connected with the accomplishment of the
objects of the agency, or for the benefit of the principal.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE
POWER OF ATORNEY IN EVIDENCE.

It is apparent from even a casual review of the
evidence that the purpose or object for which the
power of attorney was given had been accomplished.
The power of attorney therefore terminated as a
matter of law upon the return of Preece, Sr. to the
United States from abroad. (See Vol. 22, Am. Jur.
50, Agency, Sec. 56) Its admission into evidence
over objection was reversible error. If the po·wer
of attorney and the agency created thereby was not
terminated upon Preece, Sr.'s return from abroad
it would be, as a matter of general law, terminated
within a reasonable time thereafter. There rs no
basis in fact or law for attempting to justify the
trial court's holding that the power of attorney was
still in effect as an unreasonable period of time had
lapsed prior to the abortive and wholly unauthorized
act of W. J. Preece. It is clear from the record that
no attempt was made by W. J. Preece to exercise
the power from the time his father returned from
hrs mission in 1955 until1960.
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CONCLUSION

It is respectfully submitted that the act of W. J.
Preece in signing the guarantee was not within the
intent, purpose or scope of the agency created by
the power of attorney. The power of attorney was
not effectual for any purpose in 1960 as more than
a reasonable time had expired and the purpose for
which the power of attorney was given had been
accomplished. The intent and circun1Htances in connection with the giving of the power of attorney
compel the conclusion that William V. Preece, appellant herein, should not be subjected to lilability.
There is no legal authority or rule of law which
holds that such acts of a former agent are proper.
To allow an agent to execute such an instrument
wholly outside of the scope of the agency would aid
to greatly deceive and defraud innocent persons,
and completely disrupt the necessary everyday use
of a power of attorney.
The judgment of the trial court was wholly
erroneous as to the appellant and should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERL C. RITCHIE
Of the Firm of MOYLE & MOYLE
Attorneys for Appellant
810 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah.
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